Borrowed, with the owner present.
THE TEXT שיחת י"ג תשרי ה'תשד"מ · Toras Menachem — Hisvaaduyos 5744, vol. 1, pp. 158–159, סעיפים כ–כב READ THE FULL TEXT HIDE THE TEXT ▼
[כ] הענין דאהבת האב לבנו מקורו למעלה, כי זהו ענין שע"פ תורה — וכנ"ל, שע"פ התורה ישנו הענין ד"השאלתיהו לה'" מלשון השאלה בלבד, משום שהבעלות והקשר בין הורים לילדיהם נשארים תמיד.
[20] The matter of a father's love for his son has its source Above, for this is a matter rooted in Torah — and as stated above, according to Torah the matter of "I have lent him to Hashem" is from the language of lending alone, since the ownership and the bond between parents and their children remain always.
כא. ולכן: למרות שיש לבטוח בהקב"ה שיעשה את שלו וכו' — מדגישה התורה, ובתורת החסידות מודגש הדבר עוד יותר, באיזו מידה נוגע שבכל ענין תהי' תפיסת ידי אדם, מעשה של יהודי, ולא באופן ד"נהמא דכיסופא" ח"ו. ואין זה רק אשלי' ח"ו — זוהי תביעתה של תורת אמת!
וכלשון הגמרא "שלשה שותפין יש באדם", אשר למרות שהשותף העיקרי הוא הקב"ה, מ"מ היות שגם ההורים נחשבים שותפים מלאים ע"פ תורת אמת, הרי כל השלשה הם שותפים שוים.
21. And therefore: although one must trust in the Holy One that He will do His part — Torah emphasizes, and in Chassidus the matter is emphasized still more, how greatly it matters that in every matter there be the grasp of a human hand, the deed of a Jew, and not in the manner of "bread of shame," God forbid. And this is not merely a pious notion — this is the demand of the Torah of truth!
And in the language of the Gemara, "there are three partners in a person" — although the essential partner is the Holy One, nonetheless, since the parents too are reckoned full partners according to the Torah of truth, all three are equal partners.
כב. וענין נוסף שיש ללמוד מסיפור חנה:
ממשמעות הלשון שאמרה חנה בעת שקראה לילד "שמואל" — "כי מה' שאלתיו" (ולא אמרה "ביקשתיו" וכיו"ב), ניתן ללמוד, שגם אופן נתינת הילד לחנה ע"י הקב"ה הוא "בהשאלה", כלומר, פקדון שבגדר השאלה. וכידוע ומפורסם הביטוי, שילד הוא פקדון שניתן ע"י הקב"ה להוריו.
והנה מצינו בהלכה, שבפקדון ישנם ארבעה אופנים — ד' שומרים: שומר חינם והשואל נושא שכר והשוכר. וייחודו של ה"שואל" מתבטא בדין, שכאשר השאלה היא בבעלים אז השואל פטור מן הכל. ובלשון הכתוב "אם בעליו עמו לא ישלם".
וא"כ, היות שאופן הפקדון של כל ילד יהודי אצל הוריו הוא בגדר "שואל", וה"שאלה" היא באופן ד"בעליו עמו", שהרי "ה' נצב עליו" תמיד — יוצא, שתמיד ובכל מצב ההורים הם באופן של שואל בבעלים, ולכן אין להעניש אותו ח"ו, אלא אדרבה, צריך להיטיב לו עבור הצער וכו', ו"לפום צערא אגרא". והיות שזהו צער של בנו יחידו של מלך מלכי המלכים הקב"ה — מובן מהו ה"שכר" (ה"אגרא") המגיע לו עבור זה.
22. And a further matter to be learned from the story of Chana:
From the precise wording Chana used when she named the child Shmuel — "for from Hashem I borrowed him" (and she did not say "I requested him" or the like) — one can learn that the manner in which the Holy One gave the child to Chana was likewise as a loan: that is, a deposit falling under the category of a borrowed object. And the expression is well known and widely current, that a child is a deposit given by the Holy One to his parents.
Now, we find in halacha that a deposit has four modes — the four bailees: the unpaid bailee, the borrower, the paid bailee, and the renter. And the distinctiveness of the borrower is expressed in the law that when the borrowing is with the owner, the borrower is exempt from everything. In the language of Scripture: "if its owner is with him, he shall not pay."
If so — since the manner of every Jewish child's deposit with his parents falls under borrower, and the borrowing is in the manner of "its owner is with him," for "Hashem stands over him" always — it emerges that always, and in every situation, parents are in the status of a borrower with the owner present. Therefore one must not punish him, God forbid; on the contrary, one must do good to him in compensation for the pain, and "according to the pain is the reward." And since this is the pain of the only son of the King of kings, the Holy One blessed be He — it is understood what reward is due him for it.
Chana had several ways to say it. She could have said she asked for the boy, that she begged, that she prayed and was answered. What she said was כי מה' שאלתיו — from Hashem I borrowed him.
The Rebbe stops on the word, and on what she avoided: she did not say ביקשתיו. שאלה is not a synonym for asking. It is a defined transaction with defined consequences. Heard that way, a mother's sentence becomes a ruling about what a child is.
The category nobody wants
Torah recognizes four custodians: the unpaid watchman, the borrower, the paid watchman, the renter.
The instinct is to file a parent under the first. You're keeping something safe for someone else. You get nothing out of it. You're doing a favor.
The Rebbe files parents under the second — the strictest of the four, liable even for accidents he could not have prevented. The reason is the one thing a borrower can never plead: כל הנאה שלו. All the benefit is his.
You are not doing your child a favor by raising him. You are the one receiving. Say that honestly, because it is the only door into what follows.
The clause
There is one case where the borrower — the most liable party in the system — walks away owing nothing. שאלה בבעלים. If the owner is engaged alongside you when you borrow, you are exempt from all of it.
Not reduced liability. All of it. The cleanest account of why: no custodianship ever transferred. The owner never stepped back, the object never fully left his hand, and where there was no separate act of guarding there is no failed guarding to answer for.
So — is the Owner present? שהרי "ה' נצב עליו" תמיד. Not as a comforting image. As the operative fact of the case. He never handed the child over and withdrew. The loan was בבעלים from the first instant, which is why the Rebbe’s conclusion admits no exceptions: always, and in every situation, parents are in the status of a borrower with the owner present. There is no configuration of your parenting in which this stops holding.
What it buys, and what it costs
Do not punish him — and then, immediately, the reversal. On the contrary. You owe him good, in compensation for the pain. And since that pain belongs to the only son of the King of kings, you can work out what the reward attached to it must be.
The exemption doesn't leave you free. It relocates the liability. You aren't answerable to Heaven for the outcome, because the Owner never left — and precisely because He never left, the child in front of you isn't a domestic matter to be managed. He is somebody else's beloved only son, on loan, with the Father standing in the room.
Punitive discipline is usually liability-anxiety in costume. You come down hard because somewhere underneath you're afraid his failures will be charged to your account. Remove the account and the fear has nothing to stand on. What's left isn't indulgence — it's a better question. Not how do I avoid being blamed for him, but what does he actually need. The first makes you defensive. Only the second makes you useful.
The paradox, set up on purpose
The section immediately before it ought to contradict everything in it. Against the assumption that Hashem will handle His side, the Rebbe presses that every matter must be seized by human hands, by a Jew's own doing, so that what he receives isn't נהמא דכיסופא — bread of shame. Not a pious flourish. The demand of the Torah of truth.
Then the Gemara's three partners — and though the essential partner is the Holy One, the parents are full partners too, so all three are equal.
Equal partners in one paragraph; borrowers who own nothing in the next. Deliberately, back to back.
Not a contradiction — a separation of two things we habitually confuse. Your standing in the work is total: nothing gets left to Heaven, the demand on your effort is absolute. Your standing in the ownership is nil: you hold nothing, you're owed nothing, and his failures are not yours to punish.
Collapse them one way and you get a parent who does everything and forgives nothing. Collapse them the other way and you get a parent who forgives everything and does nothing. Held together, they make something rarer — total investment without proprietorship.
And it isn't only about your children
Four years later, in a footnote he actually edited, the Rebbe runs the same דין one level up, with you as the borrowed object.
Early in avodah a person takes everything from Above and gives nothing back — full benefit, full liability. Except that the moment he opens his eyes he says מודה אני לפניך, and continues with ואתה משמרה בקרבי. The Owner's presence is on the record before he has drawn a drop of benefit from anything he was given — exactly the Rambam's condition, that the owner be borrowed together with the object.
Therefore: exempt even for outright negligence. Teshuvah, certainly — he really did fail. But לא שייך אצלו ענין של עונש ח"ו.
So when you're told not to punish the child, you're being told to extend to him the ruling that already covers you. And when you wonder whether you've squandered what was entrusted to you, the answer comes back in the same words: He never let go.
That isn't consolation. It's a פסק.
NOTES
Hebrew above transcribed from the printed page, תורת מנחם — התוועדויות תשד"מ ח"א ע' 158–159. The full unit runs סעיפים יד–כב, pp. 156–159. בלתי מוגה — the volume's transcripts are "על אחריות הרושמים בלבד" and were not edited by the Rebbe. English is my own.
The closing section draws on ספר השיחות ה'תשמ"ח ח"א ע' 128–129, הערה 97 (ש"פ ויצא, ז' כסלו), which is מוגה.
Four שומרים: ב"מ צג ואילך. שאלה בבעלים: רמב"ם הל' שאלה ופקדון רפ"ב. שלשה שותפין: נדה לא, א. "כי מה' שאלתיו": שמואל-א א, כ.